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Abstract
We introduce two non-commutative variations on the original Massey-Omura encryption system
using conjugations in the symmetric group Sn. Patented in 1986, the original system was based
on the cyclic group F∗ of units in a finite field F. In place of the abelian group F∗, we will work
in the non-abelian group Sn using disjoint permutations as well as maximal abelian subgroups in
order to potentially create a more secure system. Introducing the non-abelian group Sn presents
the need to create a keyspace of commuting permutations and abelian subgroups of sufficient
size. We analyze the security of our modified systems by examining the bit-level security of each
and susceptibility to standard message attacks. Additionally, we find that the keycount for the
first system grows factorially with n. We show that the keycount for the second variation grows
exponentially with n while improving on the first modification by allowing any number of users
to participate in communication.
1 Introduction
Mathematical cryptology is the study of creating and analyzing secure methods of communication
over a public or insecure channel. Cryptographic protocols are used to allow two private parties,
commonly referred to as Alice and Bob, to communicate by concealing sensitive information with
difficult mathematics. These methods, called encryption systems, convert plaintext messages into
ciphertext messages. Alice and Bob are called validated users as the two communicators that are
permitted to possess special information about the encryption system, called the key. This key is
what Alice uses to encrypt a plaintext message and what Bob uses to decrypt a ciphertext message
back to the original plaintext. The hope in any encryption system is that only these two validated
users possess the key which any adversaries or eavesdroppers, referred to as Eve, cannot recover in
order to read their secrets.
Many of the earliest cryptographic protocols were symmetric or private key systems in which
only the two verified users hold the same private key. Since the key is necessary to both encrypt
and decrypt messages, only those two users can use the system. Although these cryptosystems are
still used today, one of the disadvantages to symmetric protocols is that each distinct pair of people
needs to establish and exchange their secret key prior to communicating. More recently, since their
discovery in the 1970s, asymmetric or public key systems have become the more popular form of
cryptographic protocol. In this type of system, Alice publishes a public encryption key that allows
anyone to communicate with her. However, Alice will also have a private decryption key of her
own that allows only her to decrypt messages. While it may seem that public key systems would
be impossible to keep secure because of the public information, their security is based on one of
several mathematical problems that are known to be significantly difficult to solve. These problems
will be discussed in greater detail later.
The Massey-Omura protocol is the cryptosystem that will be the focus of this paper. This
is a cryptosystem that was patented in 1986 by James L. Massey and Jimmy K. Omura having
properties of both a public and private key system [3]. One of the most advantageous features of this
system is that anyone can participate by creating their own keys, which resembles the asymmetric
characteristic of a public key protocol. However, in a more private-key fashion, each person that
communicates in Massey-Omura keeps both their encryption and decryption keys as secrets. Thus,
it is hard to place this scheme into one category, as it is somewhat of a hybrid between the two.
A commonly used analogy for understanding this system envisions Alice placing a lock on a
safe, Bob placing his own lock on the safe, Alice removing hers, and finally Bob removing his in
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order to access the contents of the safe. At all times the secret, or in this case the contents of the
safe, is kept secure and only the two authorized users can place and remove their locks from the
safe in order to unlock the secret message.
As we will see shortly, this scheme works because of the commutative property of exponents.
However, our goal will be instead to use non-abelian groups, in which commutativity does not
hold, in order to make the algebra of the system more difficult. This harder algebra will hopefully
increase the security of the system and make it less vulnerable to attacks.
2 The Classical Massey-Omura Scheme
2.1 The Original Protocol
The Massey-Omura encryption system, originally patented in 1986 by James Massey and Jimmy
Omura [3], is a variation on a public key system and is an example of a three-pass protocol. In this
system, Alice and Bob agree on a public parameter that allows them to create their own private
encryption and decryption keys. By design, Massey-Omura allows for virtually any number of
communicators to participate, while still keeping each key private. In this way, Massey-Omura is
somewhat of a hybrid of a public and private key system. We will now present the setup of this
system.
Massey-Omura in Z∗p
1. Alice and Bob agree on a large public prime p.
2. Alice selects two private numbers eA and dA such that eAdA ≡ 1 mod p− 1.
3. Bob selects two private numbers eB and dB in the same manner.
4. Alice sends a message m ∈ Z∗p to Bob by computing meA mod p.
5. Bob raises this message to eB and sends m
eAeB back to Alice.
6. Alice raises this message to her decryption key dA and sends the ciphertext c = m
eAeBdA
back to Bob.
7. Bob decrypts by raising c to dB and obtains the original message m.
Note that p is a public parameter, so any number of people can join the communication without
causing Alice and Bob to change their keys. Now we will show why this encryption system is sound.
That is, we will prove that Bob will always obtain Alice’s original message upon decryption.
In order to prove this works, we need Euler’s Theorem and a direct corollary to show that
Massey-Omura is a valid system. This theorem is a basic result of algebra and number theory.
Theorem 2.1 (Euler’s Theorem). Let p be a prime and let a be an integer such that p does not
divide a. Then
ap−1 ≡ 1 mod p.
Corollary 2.2. Let p be a prime and a be an integer such that p does not divide a. If x ≡ y
mod p− 1, then ax ≡ ay mod p.
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Proof. Let x, y ∈ Z and let p be a prime. Also, let a ∈ Z such that p does not divide a. Because
x ≡ y mod p − 1, there exists some k ∈ Z such that y = x + k(p − 1). Then working mod p, we
have
ay = ax+k(p−1)
= axak(p−1)
= axa(p−1)
k
.
By Theorem 2.1, ap−1 = 1 since p does not divide a. Thus, we have ay = ax.
Using Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.2, we may show why Massey-Omura works.
Proposition 2.3. Under the protocol in Massey-Omura described above, by computing cdB , Bob
will always obtain the original message m.
Proof. We will show that Bob’s final computation of cdB will allow him to uncover m. The scheme
requires Alice and Bob to choose their encryption keys such that eAdA ≡ 1 mod p − 1. By
Corollary 2.2, this means that for any a ∈ Z, ax = ay when working in Zp. Using substitution and
carrying out all calculations mod p, we know
cdB = (meAeBdA)dB
= meAeBdAdB .
We know that our exponents commute, thus we have
cdB = (meAdA)eBdB
= meBdB .
Finally, since Alice’s encryption and decryption keys are inverses of one another, as are Bob’s, we
have cdB = m.
This works because of Euler’s Theorem in Zp and the fact that integer exponents commute in
any group, which allows both Alice and Bob’s encryption and decryption keys to cancel and reveal
the plaintext message m. Notice that Bob’s final calculation is a decryption of Alice’s ciphertext,
c = meAeBdA . Since the exponents commute, we know that c = meAdAeB in which Alice’s encryption
and decryption keys will cancel. Thus c = meB and upon Bob’s final decryption he obtains the
original message m.
Example 2.4. Suppose that Alice and Bob agree on the prime p = 10067, which they publicly
announce. Of course, this means that they each will choose their private encryption and decryption
keys in Z10066. Suppose they choose eA = 649, dA = 8515, eB = 465, and dB = 4849. We can
confirm that the pairs eA and dA are inverses by computing eAdA = (649)(8515) = 1 mod 10066.
Similarly, we can confirm that eB and dB are an inverse pair. Thus, Alice and Bob’s private keys
are valid in this modulus. Finally, suppose that the secret message that Alice wants to send to Bob
is m = 540. Their communication will occur as follows.
Working in Z10067 for all calculations, Alice begins by sending meA = 540649 = 9674 to Bob.
Bob computes (meA)eB = 9674465 = 7340 and sends this back to Alice. Then, Alice computes her
ciphertext c = (meAeB )dA = 73408515 = 5501 which is then sent to Bob. Finally, Bob decrypts by
computing cdB = 55014849 = 540 = m and thus obtains Alice’s original message.
We note that Alice and Bob never had to publicly announce any of their key data; both their
encryption and decryption keys were kept private throughout communication.
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2.2 Brute Force Attack on Classical Massey-Omura
When analyzing the effectiveness of a brute force attack on Massey-Omura, it is important to note
how many key choices there are in the encryption system. Because the encryption and decryption
keys e and d are found such that ed ≡ 1 mod p − 1, e and d are units in Zp−1. Therefore, if we
can find how many units there are in our modulus p− 1 then we will know how many key choices
Alice and Bob have. By well-known properties of the Euler ϕ-function, we know that the number
of units in Zn is equal to ϕ(n). Since the encryption and decryption keys in Massey-Omura are
found mod p − 1, the number of units is ϕ(p − 1). Luckily, if we choose our prime p to be large,
p− 1 will also be large and so will be ϕ(p− 1). Let’s show this with an example.
Example 2.5. Given the prime p = 15487399, we have ϕ(p− 1) = ϕ(15487398) = 5151312. Here,
ϕ(p−1)
p−1 =
5151312
15487398 ≈ 13 , so ϕ(p− 1) is still relatively large.
In general, a result of Hardy and Wright in [2] tells us that
lim sup
n
ϕ(n)
n
= 1.
Hence ϕ(n) is roughly n in the long run. Thus, the effectiveness of a brute force attack depends on
how large p is and how fast each key can be checked. In practice, we use a key space larger than
280 ≈ 1024 as standard 80-bit security.
There are some significant pros and cons to Massey-Omura. As previously mentioned, this
public-key-like system allows anyone to participate while still keeping everyone’s encryption and
decryption keys private. Additonally, any new user can be added to the system without causing
current users to create new keys. However, it is also important to note that if Eve discovers either
an encryption or decryption key, she can find the other with no problem. By the nature of the
system, the encryption and decryption keys are units in the modulus p− 1 and are inverses of one
another; thus, using a modular calculator or the Euclidean algorithm, Eve can break the system
just by finding either one of the keys.
2.3 Message Attacks on Classical Massey-Omura
Now we will examine Massey-Omura’s susceptibility to message attacks. In a known plaintext
attack, Eve can see a plaintext message and its resulting ciphertext. Although it may seem that
knowing the type of encryption system, the plaintext message, and the ciphertext message may
give away all of the secrets of the system, this type of attack results in a famously hard problem
called the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). In the transmission, Eve will be able to see the secret
message m, the ciphertext c, and will know the public parameter p. So, in all, when Eve sees c, she
knows that c = meAeBdA = meB mod p. However, the missing information that Eve does not know
is the exponent eB. Extracting this exponent is known as the DLP and is currently known to be
very difficult to solve. Therefore, Massey-Omura is not susceptible to a known plaintext attack. In
this system, a known plaintext attack is identical to a chosen plaintext attack, in which Eve chooses
her own plaintext message to send in order to find out more about the system. These two attacks
are the same because in either Eve will know m, c, and p but will not know the exponent. Thus,
both attacks result in the DLP. If p is huge, solving the DLP will be infeasible over Zp, in which
case Massey-Omura is not vulnerable to either type of attack.
In a known ciphertext attack, Eve will simply see the ciphertext that is sent from Alice to
Bob. This is by far the weakest message attack that Eve can implement on any encryption system
because she knows the least amount of information, only the ciphertext c. In Massey-Omura, Eve
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will intercept c = meB , but unlike the two previous attacks, she will have two missing pieces of
information, m and eB. This problem is potentially harder than the DLP and thus Massey-Omura
is not susceptible to a known ciphertext attack.
Lastly, for a chosen ciphertext attack, Eve will choose the ciphertext message that is created and
then decrypted. By the nature of this system, c is always the message raised to the other person’s
encryption key. Thus, whether Eve, Alice, or Bob begins the communication, Eve cannot truly
choose the ciphertext message that is created. However, Eve can implement the following message
attack, assuming their target is naive, which is still referred to as a chosen ciphertext attack.
Chosen Ciphertext Attack on Classical MO
1. Eve creates a private number r such that it is a unit mod p.
2. Eve begins communicating with Bob and sends r disguised as meE to Bob.
3. Bob sends back reB as normal.
4. Eve stops communicating.
5. Eve intercepts a ciphertext message c = meB that was exchanged from Alice to Bob as
normal.
6. Eve asks Bob to begin communicating with her and he sends an encrypted message.
7. Eve discards the message that she just received and instead sends reBc.
8. Bob computes (reBc)dB as usual and sends the result to Eve.
9. Eve multiplies this message by r−1 and obtains Alice’s original message m.
Next we show why this attack works, again assuming the naivety of Eve’s target.
Proposition 2.6. When Eve multiplies (reBc)dB by r−1, she will obtain the original message m.
Proof. In his last step of communication, Bob computes (reBc)dB . By substitution, we know this
is equal to (reBmeB )dB . Then by distributing the exponent, the final result that he sends to Eve is
actually rm, but Bob does not know this. Lastly, Eve multiplies this result by r−1 and will obtain
m.
Of course, this message attack will only work if Bob is naive enough to begin communicating
with Eve after she asks. However, if he is so naive, then Eve will be able to use this attack to
uncover any messages that Alice sends to Bob. We will note that this attack does not give away
either eB or dB to Eve; she only obtains a single message. This means that Eve has not truly
broken the system by finding any of Alice or Bob’s private keys.
3 Massey-Omura with Cycles and Permutations
For traditional Massey-Omura, we were operating in the group of units Z∗p under multiplication.
This is a very well-understood group, which we would like to change in order to make the system
even harder to break. In original Massey-Omura, we specify the group Z∗p and then have a protocol.
Our goal is to generalize this system by replacing Z∗p by a non-abelian group and introducing
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conjugations. We will now examine the possibility of using non-abelian groups in a Massey-Omura-
style encryption system in order to potentially increase its security.
The main idea is that we will use conjugations in groups in place of exponents in our normal
Massey-Omura scheme. As Proposition 3.2 will tell us, conjugations have the same properties as
exponents, which make them optimal for creating a Massey-Omura-like system with groups. Let
us start with a group theory review.
3.1 Group Theory Background
In order to make our new algebraic structures clear, we will first define conjugations and review
some basic properties of group theory.
Definition 3.1. Let G be a group and suppose g, x ∈ G. The conjugate of x by g is the element
g−1xg. We will denote this element by xg.
Proposition 3.2. Let G be a group. For any x, g, h ∈ G, we have the following:
1. (xg)h = xgh
2. xe = x
3. xgyg = (xy)g
4. xg = yg implies x = y
5. (xg)−1 = (x−1)g.
Proof. Starting with Property 1, we know that
(xg)h = h−1(xg)h
= h−1(g−1xg)h
= (h−1g−1)x(gh)
= (gh)−1x(gh)
= xgh.
For Property 3, we have
xgyg = (g−1xg)(g−1yg)
= g−1x(gg−1)yg
= g−1xyg
= (xy)g.
Proofs of all other properties follow by similar, straightforward calculations.
Definition 3.3. The symmetric group on n letters, denoted Sn, is the group of permutations of
the set {1, 2, . . . , n} under function composition.
Definition 3.4. A subgroup of a symmetric group Sn is called a permutation group.
We will use juxtaposition as the notation for composition of permutations for simplicity of
reading. It is important to note that permutation multiplication is usually not commutative. We
will demonstrate this with the following example.
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Example 3.5. Consider the following elements of S4. Let
σ =
(
1 2 3 4
3 1 4 2
)
τ =
(
1 2 3 4
2 3 4 1
)
.
Then we have
στ =
(
1 2 3 4
1 4 2 3
)
,
yet
τσ =
(
1 2 3 4
4 2 1 3
)
.
We note that this non-commutativity is not unique to this example. In fact, Sn is non-abelian
whenever n ≥ 3.
Proposition 3.6. Let G be a group with a, b ∈ G. Then, if a and b commute, then so do:
• a and b−1
• a−1 and b
• a−1 and b−1.
Proof. To prove the first item, working in a group G with a, b ∈ G, suppose that a and b commute.
We want to show that ab−1 = b−1a. We have
ab−1 = b−1bab−1
= b−1abb−1
= b−1a.
The others are proven similarly.
3.2 Massey-Omura and Conjugation
We now present our new protocol using conjugation in Sn. Although any non-abelian group would
work for this system, we choose to work with Sn as this group is a standard example of a non-abelian
group. Suppose Alice and Bob have a way to create private double-blind commuting permutations.
This means that Alice and Bob can fix a public parameter n and somehow create commuting
permutations in Sn without ever making them public. Then, we can apply these conjugations to
a non-commutative Massey-Omura scheme. Below we give a general protocol for implementing
Massey-Omura encryption over Sn.
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Massey-Omura in Sn
1. Let α and α−1 be Alice’s encryption and decryption keys. Similarly, let β and β−1 be
Bob’s keys.
2. Assume that Alice and Bob can choose double-blind commuting permutations.
3. Alice has a message m ∈ Sn structured as a permutation that she wishes to send to Bob.
She first computes the conjugation mα = α−1mα and sends this to Bob.
4. Now, Bob sends (mα)β = mαβ back to Alice.
5. Next, Alice would send back c = (mαβ)α
−1
= mαβα
−1
.
6. Finally, Bob decrypts by computing cβ
−1
= (mαβα
−1
)β
−1
= mαβα
−1β−1 .
Proposition 3.7. When Bob decrypts the ciphertext c, he will obtain Alice’s original message m.
Proof. We want to show that cβ
−1
= m. First, we must show that c = mβ so that when Bob
decrypts, he will obtain m. Using Proposition 3.2.1, we have
c = (mαβ)α
−1
= mαβα
−1
.
Because α and β were chosen such that they commute, by Proposition 3.6 we know that β and α−1
also commute. Hence we have
c = mαα
−1β
= mβ.
Next, when Bob decrypts by his β−1, we have
cβ
−1
= (mβ)β
−1
= mββ
−1
= m.
Thus, Bob has successfully obtained Alice’s original message m.
This brings us to the primary focus of this thesis.
Main question: How can Alice and Bob blindly choose α and β so that they will always
commute?
In traditional Massey-Omura, Bob’s last step works because of the commutative property of
exponents, allowing his encryption and decryption keys to cancel, leaving only the message be-
hind. However, we cannot always guarantee that the factors in our previous conjugation, α and β,
commute because Sn is a non-abelian group. Thus, Alice’s exponents will not always cancel and
our modified Massey-Omura system will not work. We will now explore the possibility of using
commuting cycles to fix this problem.
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3.3 Cycle Notation
We will now begin to use standard cycle notation for permutations; this is a much easier and
more efficient representation for manipulating permutations. As an example, ( 1 2 3 4 51 5 2 4 3 ) can be
represented as a cycle of length 3, written (253). For an example of a product of two cycles,
(253)(145) = (14325). However, note that in this example, (145)(253) = (14532) 6= (14325).
Definition 3.8. Two cycles in Sn, σ = (a1 a2 · · · ak) and τ = (b1 b2 · · · bl), are disjoint if ai 6= bj
for all i and j.
For example, σ = (135) and τ = (246) are disjoint in S6. The following well-known proposition
will be key in obtaining our goal of using permutation groups and conjugation in Massey-Omura.
Proposition 3.9. Let σ and τ be two disjoint cycles in Sn. Then στ = τσ.
Thus, if we can create two disjoint cycles, they will always commute and we can use them in
our new Massey-Omura scheme.
3.4 Massey-Omura with Disjoint Cycles
Now we will begin to use conjugation with disjoint cycles to finally create a new Massey-Omura-like
system. In our system, Alice and Bob will agree on a public symmetric group Sn, where n is even,
from which they will choose their disjoint cycles. The set {1, 2, . . . , n} is partitioned into two equal
halves: A = {1, 2, . . . , n2 } for Alice and B = {n2 + 1, . . . , n} for Bob. Alice’s job is to create a cycle
by moving only her half, A, which means she will fix everything in Bob’s half, B. Likewise, Bob
will create a cycle by moving only his half, B, while fixing everything in Alice’s half, A. These
cycles are Alice and Bob’s private encryption keys (α and β), and their respective inverses will be
their private decryption keys (α−1 and β−1). It is clear that α and β will always be disjoint cycles
because Alice and Bob chose them by permuting only their own halves of {1, 2, . . . , n}. Finally,
we can introduce Massey-Omura with Disjoint Cycles. We will need the following definition for
notation purposes.
Definition 3.10. Let σ ∈ Sn be a permutation. We define the moved-set M(σ) to be
M(σ) = {x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} | σ(x) 6= x} .
Similarly, we define the fixed-set F (σ) to be
F (σ) = {x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} | σ(x) = x} .
Below is a description of how to implement our version of Massey-Omura encryption over Sn
by using disjoint cycles.
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Massey-Omura with Disjoint Cycles (MODC)
1. Alice and Bob agree on a public symmetric group Sn.
2. Alice creates a cycle α with M(α) ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n2 } as defined above. Similarly, Bob creates
a cycle β with M(β) ⊆ {n2 + 1, . . . , n− 1, n}.
3. Alice has a message m ∈ Sn structured as a permutation that she wishes to send to Bob.
She first computes the conjugation mα and sends this to Bob.
4. Bob takes this message and computes (mα)β and sends it to Alice.
5. Alice creates the ciphertext c by computing (mαβ)α
−1
= mβ and sends it to Bob.
6. Bob finally decrypts by computing (mβ)β
−1
and obtains the original message m.
Example 3.11. Suppose Alice and Bob agree to work in S6. As a disclaimer, S6 is too small for
practical purposes, but we will still use it as an example. Then, Alice creates her own cycle by
permuting only the first 62 = 3 numbers. Let Alice’s encryption and decryption keys be
α =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 3 1 4 5 6
)
= (123) and α−1 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
3 1 2 4 5 6
)
= (132).
Likewise, Bob creates his own cycle by permuting only the last 3 numbers. Let Bob’s encryption
and decryption keys be
β =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 6 4 5
)
= (465) and β−1 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 5 6 4
)
= (456).
Finally, suppose Alice wants to send Bob the following message:
m =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 5 1 6 4 3
)
= (125463).
First Alice sends mα = (132)(125463)(123) = (154623) to Bob. Bob then sends mαβ =
(456)(154623)(465) = (165423) back. Next, Alice sends (mαβ)α
−1
= mβ = (123)(165423)(132) =
(126543). Finally, Bob decrypts by computing (mβ)β
−1
= β(mβ)β−1 = (465)(126543)(456) =
(125463) = m.
Bob obtained the original message m in the end, just as he should. Note that this message
was created as a cycle, but it does not have to be. Alice’s m can be any permutation in whichever
group Sn Alice and Bob agree upon.
Now that we have established our new Massey-Omura system with disjoint cycles, we can
analyze the key count as a first measure of security. To find a formula, we want to count the
number of possible cycles of length k. There are k! ways to arrange k objects. We know that the
way cycles are written is not unique; there are actually k ways to write each cycle. So, we find the
number of unique k-cycles is k!k = (k−1)!. In our system, though, Alice and Bob both create cycles
of maximal length k = n2 , so the exact number of keys they each have is(n
2
− 1
)
!.
Using this formula, we can determine how big our keyspace would need to be in order to thwart
a brute force attack. The three most standard measures, in practice, for analyzing security against
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brute force are 80-bit, 128-bit, and 256-bit security. For example, 80-bit security requires that we
have at least 280 ≈ 1.2 × 1024 keys in our keyspace. In order to make brute force infeasible, we
need to find which n value in our formula would make the size of the keyspace greater than 280.
By using the above formula, we find that 52 is the smallest n such that
(
n
2 − 1
)
! > 280. So, S52
gives the smallest keyspace that guarantees 80-bit security. Similarly, we find that S72 and S118
guarantee 128-bit and 256-bit security, respectively.
It is important to note that it is logical to create two equal halves from which Alice and Bob
choose permutations. If Alice, for example, had a larger set than Bob to choose from, Bob’s keys
would inherently be more vulnerable since they came from a smaller keyspace. Thus, for creating
a system for two parties to use, splitting Sn into two equal halves is optimal.
3.5 Massey-Omura with Disjoint Permutations
We will now extend this new system by creating another variation using disjoint permutations in
place of cycles. Let us start with the following definition and proposition.
Definition 3.12. Permutations σ, τ ∈ Sn are disjoint if M(σ) ∩M(τ) = ∅.
Proposition 3.13. Let σ and τ be two disjoint permutations in Sn. Then στ = τσ.
Proof. Let σ and τ be disjoint permutations in Sn. We want to show that σ(τ(x)) = τ(σ(x)) for
all x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. There are two cases in which we must prove this to be true.
Case 1: x is fixed by both σ and τ ; x ∈ F (σ) and x ∈ F (τ).
This means that σ(x) = x and τ(x) = x. In this case, we have
σ(τ(x)) = σ(x) = x.
We also have
τ(σ(x)) = τ(x) = x.
Hence, σ(τ(x)) = τ(σ(x)).
Case 2: x is fixed by only one of σ or τ .
Suppose first that x ∈ M(σ) and x ∈ F (τ). Then, σ(τ(x)) = σ(x). We can also show that
τ(σ(x)) = σ(x). To prove this, we claim that σ(x) ∈ F (τ). Suppose instead σ(x) ∈ M(τ). Then
σ(x) ∈ F (σ). This implies that σ(σ(x)) = σ(x). As σ is one-to-one, σ(x) = x and hence, x ∈ F (σ).
However, this is a contradiction to our assumption that x ∈ M(σ). Hence, σ(x) ∈ F (τ) and thus
τ(σ(x)) = σ(x). The proof for when x ∈ M(τ) and x ∈ F (σ) follows similarly. In all cases, it is
true that στ = τσ.
Hence, instead of using cycles, we can also use any disjoint permutations since they will also
commute. Now we will introduce Massey-Omura with Disjoint Permutations.
Similar to our MODC system, Alice and Bob will again agree on a public symmetric group Sn,
where n must be even, from which they will choose their disjoint permutations. Again, we create
two equal partitions by halving {1, 2, . . . , n}: A = {1, 2, . . . , n2 } for Alice and B = {n2 + 1, . . . , n}
for Bob. Alice will create any permutation by moving only elements in her half, A, which means
she will fix everything in Bob’s half, B. Similarly, Bob will create his permutation by only moving
elements in his half, B, while fixing all elements in Alice’s half, A. These are Alice and Bob’s
private encryption keys (α and β), and their respective inverses will be their private decryption
keys (α−1 and β−1). Just as before, α and β will always be disjoint permutations because Alice
and Bob only permuted their own halves, A and B. Hence, they will commute.
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Massey-Omura with Disjoint Permutations (MODP)
1. Alice and Bob agree on a public symmetric group Sn.
2. Alice chooses a permutation α with M(α) ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n2 }. Similarly, Bob chooses a
permutation β with M(β) ⊆ {n2 + 1, . . . , n− 1, n}.
3. Alice has a message m ∈ Sn structured as a permutation that she wishes to send to Bob.
She first computes the conjugation mα and sends this to Bob.
4. Bob takes this message and computes (mα)β and sends it to Alice.
5. Alice creates the ciphertext c by computing (mαβ)α
−1
= mβ and sends it to Bob.
6. Bob finally decrypts by computing cβ
−1
and obtains the original message m.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 3.7, Bob will obtain m by decrypting the ciphertext c
because α and β were again chosen such that they commute.
Example 3.14. Suppose Alice and Bob work in S8. Then, Alice creates a permutation by moving
only the first 82 = 4 entries of {1, 2, . . . , 8}. Let Alice’s encryption and decryption keys be
α =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 1 2 5 6 7 8
)
and α−1 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 1 2 5 6 7 8
)
.
Similarly, Bob creates his own permutation by moving only the last 4 numbers. Let Bob’s encryption
and decryption keys be
β =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 8 7 6 5
)
and β−1 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 8 7 6 5
)
.
Finally, suppose Alice wants to send Bob the following message:
m =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5 4 3 1 6 7 2 8
)
.
First Alice sends
mα =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 3 5 2 6 7 4 8
)
to Bob. Next, Bob sends
mαβ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 3 8 2 5 4 6 7
)
back to Alice. Then, Alice responds by sending
mαβα
−1
= mβ = c =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8 4 3 1 5 2 6 7
)
back to Bob. Lastly, Bob computes
cβ
−1
=
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5 4 3 1 6 7 2 8
)
and obtains the original message m.
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Now that we have established Massey-Omura with disjoint permutations, we can analyze its
security as we did with our previous modified system with disjoint cycles. First we will look at the
key count. Since Alice is permitted to create any permutation from her half of the n2 elements, the
key count for this system can be found with (n
2
)
!.
Using this formula, we can determine how big our n would need to be in order to thwart a
brute force attack. For an example, to find the smallest n to guarantee 80-bit security, we find the
smallest n such that n2 ! > 2
80 ≈ 1.2 × 1024. We find that 50 would be the minimal permutation
length that is necessary, while for 128-bit security, we would need to work in S70.
3.6 Comparing MODC and MODP
First, we will note that it is difficult to compare the security of our modified systems with that of
the original Massey-Omura encryption system. Original MO has a key count based on the Euler
ϕ-function, while the key counts of MODC and MODP are based on the lengths of cycles and
permutations in an agreed upon n for Sn. Since these are two different mathematical environments,
it is not easy to compare them directly. However, the fact that MODC and MODP’s key counts
grow by a factorial gives a very fast-growing count, which is good for high security.
When comparing the security of MODC to MODP, we will first examine their minimum key
lengths for 80- and 128-bit security. For 80-bit security, MODC requires a minimum cycle of length
52 while MODP only requires a permutation length of 50. Similarly, for 128-bit security, MODC
requires a minimum cycle length of 72 as compared to the minimum permutation length of 70 in
MODP. Although in both cases this is only a difference of length 2, it is still a slight difference that
is important to note.
The message attacks for MODC and MODP are parallel to those in the original Massey-Omura
system. In the original protocol, security is based on the well-known Discrete Logarithm Problem
(DLP). That is, if at any point Eve knows both the message m and its encrypted output, say
meA , finding eA is not feasible. Our two systems are similarly not vulnerable to a known or
chosen plaintext attack. In our new systems, the algebra is no longer based on exponentiation, but
rather conjugation. In MODP, for example, the missing piece of information is not an exponent,
but rather a permutation and that permutation’s inverse. Here, if Eve knows m and a resulting
encryption of α−1mα, finding the value of α is known as the conjugacy search problem (CSP).
Presented in [4], this problem is the conjugacy equivalent of the DLP and is hence thought to be a
substantially difficult problem. Next, in a known ciphertext attack, Eve would only know one piece
of information in the last pass, namely c. Again, similar to the original system, this attack would
result in a problem that is potentially harder than CSP. So, MODC and MODP are not vulnerable
to a known ciphertext attack.
Lastly, MODC and MODP cannot really have a true chosen ciphertext attack because c is
always the message conjugated by the other communicator’s encryption key, just as in the original
Massey-Omura system. However, the same variation as before on a chosen ciphertext attack can
be implemented. We leave the description of this attack as an exercise for the reader. Similar to
our original system, if Eve discovers either the encryption or decryption key in MODC or MODP
(the cycle/permutation and its inverse, respectively), she can find the other with no problem.
As previously mentioned in Section 2.2, original Massey-Omura is a public-key-like system
that allows anyone to participate while also keeping everyone’s keys private. This is a significant
advantage to the original system because it allows for as many communicators to join as needed.
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On the other hand, MODC and MODP only allow for two people to communicate because of the
way the private keys are chosen. Since Alice and Bob must agree on an Sn and must create their
keys by splitting the cycle or permutation in two parts, only two people can use this agreed upon
system. So, for every unique pair of communicators, a new Sn would need to be decided on and
thus each person would need to create two new keys.
The only way that Alice and Bob could invite another communicator, Carl, to their system is
if they create their keys by dividing the set {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} into three parts and agreeing to only
permute their assigned third. However, this would affect the minimum size of n they can choose
to thwart a brute force attack. For three communicators, to reach 80-bit security, they would need
to work in S75 as opposed to S50. Similarly, to reach 128-bit security, they would need to work
in S105 as opposed to S70. This is a 25-bit and 35-bit length difference for just adding one more
communicator, so we can see that adding many more parties would require a significantly larger
choice of Sn. We will now further examine this same idea, incorporating k parties into MODP.
3.7 MODP with Multiple Parties
We can further modify MODP to create a system in which k parties can use the system. Here we
take the set {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}, divide it into k blocks of equal size (assuming n is a multiple of k), and
allow participants to choose permutations from their respective block. Taking the formula for the
original key count for MODP, we can calculate the key count for this system with k parties with(n
k
)
!.
Looking at five examples of k values, we can see how the n necessary to reach a certain key count
increases as the number of parties increases. The table below gives the minimal n in the symmetric
group Sn required to reach standard bit level security for k parties.
k 80-bit 128-bit 256-bit
2 50 70 116
3 75 105 174
4 100 140 232
6 150 210 348
8 200 280 464
As we see in the table above, the growth of each n is linear as k increases. To see why that
is, consider the following example of the inequality m! > 280. Here, we are finding the minimal m
such that this inequality is true so that we can reach standard 80-bit security. Using a computer
search we find that this minimum value of m is 25. Since we are working with k parties, we know
that m = nk . Knowing this, we have
n
k
= 25
n = 25k.
Thus, at each k for 80-bit security, we see that the necessary n increases by 25 each time. We can
find similar equations for 128- and 256-bit security as well.
In practice, if we know our machine can only handle an n equal to 500, we can follow a similar
procedure to find how many parties we can allow to participate in communication. Suppose we
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want 128-bit security, where each increase of k by an increment of 1 increases n by 35. Then we
have
500 = 35k.
Solving for k, we obtain k ≈ 14.3, meaning that we can allow 14 people to communicate in this
system considering our limitations of a 500-length permutation and 128-bit security.
4 Massey-Omura with Maximal Abelian Subgroups
We will now use maximal abelian subgroups of Sn in place of disjoint cycles and permutations in
our modified version of Massey-Omura. As mentioned earlier, our first two modifications only allow
for a limited number of people to participate in communication. Although we additionally created
MODP with k parties, we saw that the size of n grew quickly with each additional user. Massey-
Omura with Abelian Subgroups (MOAS) will be independent of the number of allowed parties
and will allow any number of participants to communicate. This is optimal in an encryption
system because it does not require communicators to create separate keys each time they wish to
communicate with a different user.
In MOAS, Alice and Bob will agree on any public group Sn from which they will find an abelian
subgroup A, which they will also publish. Alice will choose an element α ∈ A while Bob chooses a
β ∈ A, which are their private encryption keys. It follows that they both also have α−1 and β−1,
their private decryption keys. MOAS proceeds in the following way.
Massey-Omura with Maximal Abelian Subgroups (MOAS)
1. Alice and Bob agree on a symmetric group Sn with a public abelian subgroup A.
2. Alice chooses an element α ∈ A while Bob chooses β ∈ A.
3. Alice has a message m ∈ Sn that she wishes to send to Bob. She first computes the
conjugation mα and sends this to Bob.
4. Bob takes this message and computes (mα)β and sends it to Alice.
5. Alice creates the ciphertext c by computing (mαβ)α
−1
= mβ and sends it to Bob.
6. Bob finally decrypts by computing (mβ)β
−1
and obtains the original message m.
Because α and β are elements of the abelian subgroup A, they will always commute. Thus, as
proved in Proposition 3.7, Bob will obtain m by decrypting the ciphertext c.
Now that we have established MOAS, we can analyze its security as we did with our previous
two modified systems. First we will examine the key count of this new system. We want to find
the size of the keyspace, which is precisely the size of the subgroup A.
We want our keyspace to be as large as possible for security reasons, so we need to find an
abelian subgroup A of Sn of maximal order to choose for our keyspace. As shown by Burns and
Goldsmith’s result in [1], we have the following theorem. This theorem gives the maximal order of
abelian subgroups of the symmetric group. This result will give us three cases in which the size of
the keyspace depends on the congruence class of n mod 3. We note that this theorem gives the size
and anatomy of the subgroups that we will implement in MOAS, but we also need to find examples
for actual implementation of the system. This theorem gives the maximal abelian subgroups of Sn
up to isomorphism type; it does not give concrete examples of who these groups are. We will give
several examples separately.
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Theorem 4.1 (Burns-Goldsmith [1]). Let A be an abelian subgroup of maximal order of the sym-
metric group Sn. Then
(i) A ∼= Zk3 if n = 3k,
(ii) A ∼= Z2 × Zk3 if n = 3k + 2,
(iii) either A ∼= Z4 × Zk−13 or A ∼= Z2 × Z2 × Zk−13 if n = 3k + 1.
We now have the following two important questions:
• What are these groups? How can we find examples for implementation?
• How can we calculate key counts?
Now, by finding examples of maximal abelian subgroups as specified by [1], we will answer our
first important question.
Proposition 4.2. Let G be a group with elements a1, a2, . . . , ak. Suppose that these elements
commute, so that aiaj = ajai for all i and j. Then the subset
H = {ar11 ar22 · · · arkk : ri ∈ Z}
is an abelian subgroup of G.
Proof. To show that H is a subgroup of G, we will apply the Subgroup Test. We know that
a01a
0
2 · · · a0k = e ∈ H when all ri = 0 ∈ Z. Hence, the identity element from G is in H. Next we
must show that for any elements a, b ∈ H, ab ∈ H. Let
a = ar11 a
r2
2 · · · arkk and b = aq11 aq22 · · · aqkk .
Then
ab = (ar11 a
r2
2 · · · arkk )(aq11 aq22 · · · aqkk ).
Since aiaj = ajai for all i, j, we have
ab = (ar11 a
q1
1 )(a
r2
2 a
q2
2 ) · · · (arkk aqkk )
= ar1+q11 a
r2+q2
2 · · · ark+qkk ∈ H.
Hence the operation is closed. Lastly, we will show that each element a ∈ H has an inverse within
H. If a = ar11 a
r2
2 · · · arkk then a−1 = a−r11 a−r22 · · · a−rkk , and so each element a ∈ H has an inverse
within H. Because all three conditions in the Subgroup Test were satisfied, H is a subgroup of
G. Since all of the elements ai and aj commute in G, H is automatically abelian. Thus, H is an
abelian subgroup of G.
Now that we have created an abelian subgroup H of G, in order to correctly find |H|, we will
need to have the following definition.
Definition 4.3. Let S = {a1, a2, . . . , ak} be a finite set of elements in an abelian group H. We say
that the set S is independent in H if whenever a power of ai is expressed in terms of the other
elements aj (j 6= i) as
asi = a
r1
1 · · · ari−1i−1 ari+1i+1 · · · arkk
we have asi = e.
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Lemma 4.4. Suppose that H is an abelian group and that S = {a1, a2, . . . , ak} is a finite subset
of H. Suppose that each element ai ∈ S has finite order mi. If S is an independent set in H, then
ar11 a
r2
2 · · · arkk = e implies that ri ≡ 0 mod mi for all i.
Proof. Let S = {a1, a2, . . . , ak} be a finite set of elements in an abelian group H and suppose S is
independent. Consider the equation
e = ar11 · · · ari−1i−1 arii ari+1i+1 · · · arkk .
Solving for arii , we have
arii = a
−r1
1 · · · a−ri−1i−1 a−ri+1i+1 · · · a−rkk .
Since S is independent, this means that arii = e. By Lagrange, we have ri ≡ 0 mod mi.
Now we can finally state our theorem.
Theorem 4.5. Let S = {a1, a2, . . . , ak} be a finite set of elements in the abelian group H =
{ar11 ar22 · · · arkk : ri ∈ Z}. If S = {a1, a2, . . . , ak} is an independent set in H and mi = ord(ai) is
finite, then
|H| = m1m2 · · ·mk.
Proof. Let S = {a1, a2, . . . , ak} be an independent set in the abelian group H = {ar11 ar22 · · · arkk :
ri ∈ Z}. Also let mi = ord(ai) be finite. We may restrict ri, si < mi. Suppose
ar11 a
r2
2 · · · arkk = as11 as22 · · · askk .
Then
ar1−s11 = a
s2−r2
2 · · · ask−rkk .
Because S is independent, we know that ar1−s1 = e which implies that r1 − s1 ≡ 0 mod m1. So,
since we chose r1, s1 < m1, we find r1 = s1.
Now, we can left cancel and obtain ar22 · · · arkk = as22 · · · arkk . Following the same argument, we
find that ri = si for each i. Then, since there are mi ways to choose each ri, we find |H| =
m1m2 · · ·mk.
The proof of the following is immediate.
Corollary 4.6. In the situation above, there is an isomorphism
H ∼= Zm1 × Zm2 × · · · × Zmk
given by
ar11 a
r2
2 · · · arkk 7→ (r1, r2, . . . , rk).
We now present examples of how we find such maximal abelian subgroups of Sn as shown in [1].
Example 4.7. We will work in S12 for this example. Since 12 ≡ 0 mod 3, we take the first case
from Theorem 4.1. So, the maximal abelian subgroups of S12 are isomorphic to
Z3 × Z3 × Z3 × Z3.
We will then divide {1, 2, . . . , 12} into four disjoint subsets of size three, like {1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}, {7, 8, 9},
and {10, 11, 12}. From this partition, we can create disjoint permutations, for example:
σ1 = (312), σ2 = (645), σ3 = (978), σ4 = (11 12 10).
Let A be the subgroup generated by these four permutations. Since these cycles are disjoint, they
clearly commute and are independent. By Corollary 4.6, it is immediate that A ∼= Z43 and is
therefore maximal by Theorem 4.1. Note that in this case, this abelian subgroup has order 81.
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Now that we have shown an example of how to find examples of these subgroups, we will now
show an example of communication between Alice and Bob in S12.
Example 4.8. Using the same cycles as in Example 4.7, let α = σ21σ3σ4 and let β = σ
2
2σ3σ
2
4.
Let m =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 4 7 2 5 6 10 12 8 3 9 11
)
. Communication between Alice and Bob
proceeds as follows.
1. Alice sends mα =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
9 2 4 3 5 6 11 7 12 8 10 1
)
to Bob.
2. Bob sends mαβ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
8 2 5 4 3 6 9 10 12 1 7 11
)
back to Alice.
3. Alice sends mαβα
−1
= c =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 5 9 4 2 6 10 7 11 12 3 8
)
back to Bob.
4. Finally Bob decrypts by computing cβ
−1
=
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 4 7 2 5 6 10 12 8 3 9 11
)
,
which is m.
For clarity, we also present an example to show how maximal abelian subgroups are found in
the second case of Theorem 4.1.
Example 4.9. We will work in S14 for this example. Since 14 can be represented as 3(4)+2, we take
the second case from Theorem 4.1. So, the maximal abelian subgroups of S14 are isomorphic to Z2×
Z43. We can divide {1, 2, . . . , 14} into five disjoint subsets, like {1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}, {6, 7, 8}, {9, 10, 11}
and {12, 13, 14}. From these partitions, five disjoint permutations can created. For example,
σ1 = (12), σ2 = (354), σ3 = (687), σ4 = (11 9 10), and σ5 = (12 13 14). Let A be the subgroup
generated by these five permutations. Since these cycles are disjoint, they clearly commute and
are independent. By Corollary 4.6, it is immediate that A ∼= Z2 × Z43 and is therefore maximal by
Theorem 4.6. Note that in this case, this abelian subgroup has order 162.
We can find the key counts for Alice and Bob in each of the three cases. For the first case,
A ∼= Zk3, so we have k number of Z3’s. Hence, we find that there are 3k = 3
n
3 key choices. We
similarly solve for the other two cases and obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4.10. When Alice and Bob choose their private keys from a maximal abelian subgroup
of Sn, we obtain a valid encryption scheme over Sn using MOAS. The resulting system has the
following key counts:
• 3n3 key choices when n = 3k
• 2 · 3n−23 key choices when n = 3k + 2
• 4 · 3n−43 key choices when n = 3k + 1.
All of these key counts are on the order of
(
3
√
3
)n ≈ 1.44n.
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5 Summary Key Counts and Comparisons
A natural final question now presents itself. Of the two versions of our modified Massey-Omura
system we have created, MODP and MOAS, which is optimal? By comparing the n necessary in
the group Sn to reach each standard bit level security for both systems, we can start to answer
this question. The table below gives the minimal n required to reach standard bit level security,
comparing multiple parties in MODP versus MOAS.
80-bit 128-bit 256-bit
2 parties 50 70 116
3 parties 75 105 174
4 parties 100 140 232
5 parties 125 175 290
6 parties 150 210 348
7 parties 175 245 406
8 parties 200 280 464
9 parties 225 315 522
Max ab subgp 152 243 485
By looking at this table, we see that in the case of communication between only 2 parties, using
MODP is optimal because it requires a significantly lower n than that of MOAS. However, in order
to reach 80-bit security for 7 parties, the necessary n is 175, while MOAS only requires n = 152 and
allows for any number of participants. This gives way to the idea of where our two systems break
even in relation to the number of communicators participating and the desired bit-level security.
Similarly, the break even point for 128-bit security is also at 7 parties. The break even point for
256-bit security is at 9 parties, in contrast. Hence, the number of parties in a particular instance
of communication is one way to determine which of the two systems is optimal. For instance, if a
group of 9 people wish to communicate with 128-bit security, they should use the maximal abelian
subgroup system, as they will work in S243 as opposed to S315.
This research brings about several questions that have yet to be answered. Among them are:
• Can we determine exactly the complexity of the conjugacy search problem in Sn?
• When using disjoint permutations, do vulnerabilities arise because Alice’s key fixes half of
the elements? Does this reveal information to Eve about the plaintext?
• Can this actually be implemented? Are these systems computationally feasible?
Answering these questions would tell us more about the usability of these systems.
19
References
[1] J. M. Burns and B. Goldsmith, Maximal order abelian subgroups of symmetric groups, Bulletin
of the London Mathematical Society 21 (1989), no. 1, 70.
[2] G.H. Hardy, E.M. Wright, R. Heath-Brown, A. Wiles, and J. Silverman, An introduction to the
theory of numbers, Oxford Mathematics Series, Oxford University Press, 2008.
[3] J.L. Massey and J.K. Omura, Method and apparatus for maintaining the privacy of digital
messages conveyed by public transmission, January 28 1986, US Patent 4,567,600.
[4] A. Myasnikov, V. Shpilrain, and A. Ushakov, Group-based cryptography, Advanced Courses in
Mathematics CRM Barcelona, Birkhauser Verlag, 2008.
20
